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1. What is action-oriented perception?
ZOE DRAYSON
Abstract. Contemporary scientific and philosophical literature on perception often fo-
cuses on the relationship between perception and action, emphasizing the ways in which
perception can be understood as geared towards action or ‘action-oriented’. In this paper
I provide a framework within which to classify approaches to action-oriented perception,
and I highlight important differences between the distinct approaches. I show how talk
of perception as action-oriented can be applied to the evolutionary history of perception,
neural or psychological perceptual mechanisms, the semantic content or phenomenal
character of perceptual states, or to the metaphysical nature of perception. I argue that
there are no straightforward inferences from one kind of action-oriented perception to an-
other. Using this framework and its insights, I then explore the notion of action-oriented
perceptual representation which plays a key role in some approaches to embodied cog-
nitive science. I argue that the concept of action-oriented representation proposed by
Clark and Wheeler is less straightforward than it might seem, because it seems to re-
quire both that the mechanisms of perceptual representation are action-oriented and that
the content of these perceptual representations are action-oriented. Given that neither
of these claims can be derived from the other, proponents of action-oriented representa-
tion owe us separate justification for each claim. I will argue that such justifications are
not forthcoming in the literature, and that attempts to reconstruct them run into trouble:
the sorts of arguments offered for the representational mechanisms being action-oriented
seem to undermine the sorts of arguments offered for the representational content being
action-oriented, and vice-versa.
1 Introduction
Contemporary scientific and philosophical literature on perception often focuses on the
relationship between perception and action, emphasizing the ways in which percep-
tion can be understood as geared towards action. Research in psychology, for exam-
ple, sometimes characterizes perception as “action-specific” (Can˜al-Bruland & van der
Kamp, 2009; Witt, 2011), and talk of perception as being “of affordances for action” is
found in both psychology and philosophy (Richardson, Shockley, Fajen, Riley, & Turvey,
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2008; Chemero, 2011). Descriptions of perception as “active” are found in vision sci-
ence (Whitehead & Ballard, 1990), artificial intelligence (Weyns, Steegmans, & Holvoet,
2004), psychology (Aloimonos, 2013), and philosophy (Noe¨, 2004); and as “enactive” in
robotics (Morse & Ziemke, 2007), cognitive science (Froese & Spiers, 2007), and philos-
ophy (Thompson, 2007). In psychology (Fajen, 2005) and also in sports science (Pijpers,
Oudejans, & Bakker, 2007), perception is described as being “for action”; while the term
“action-oriented” is applied to perception in philosophy (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2014),
computer science (Gora & P., 2014), and neuroscience (Ridderinkhof, 2014).
In what follows, I’ll use the term ‘action-oriented’ as an umbrella-term to include ap-
proaches like these that share the idea of perception as oriented or geared towards action,
in some sense. My first aim in this paper is to provide a framework within which to
classify approaches to action-oriented perception, and to highlight important differences
between distinct approaches.
My framework classifies action-oriented approaches to perception into one of five cate-
gories:
1. The evolution of perception as action-oriented: these approaches claim that per-
ception evolved to guide action, or that perception was selected for its action-
oriented capacities.
2. The mechanisms of perception as action-oriented: these approaches claim that the
mechanisms of perception overlap with, or are closely coupled to, the mechanisms
of action.
3. The contents of perception as action-oriented: these approaches claim that the con-
tents of perception present the world to the perceiver in terms of possible actions.
4. The phenomenal character of perception as action-oriented: these approaches claim
that a perceptual state is qualitatively experienced as encouraging or demanding a
certain action.
5. The nature of perception as action-oriented: these approaches claim that percep-
tion has a necessary connection to action, that to be a perceiver is essentially to
have certain agentive capacities or skills.
Part of my motivation for providing this framework is to clarify the discussions of action-
oriented perception across philosophy and the sciences. I will show that each approach
within the framework is logically independent of the others: none of the approaches can
be derived from the others without further justificatory assumptions. We should thus not
conclude from the fact that perception is action-oriented in one respect that it is action-
oriented in any of the other respects.
This paper also has a second aim, which is to use this framework to explore the role of
action-oriented perception in embodied cognitive science. In particular, I will focus on
the claim that perceptual representations can be action-oriented. I will show that Clark
(1997) and Wheeler (2005) put forward a concept of action-oriented perceptual repre-
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sentations which is committed to both the representational mechanisms of perception
being action-oriented, and to their contents being action oriented. But given that neither
of these claims can be derived from the other, proponents of action-oriented representa-
tion owe us separate justification for each claim. I will argue that such justifications are
not forthcoming in the literature, and that attempts to reconstruct them run into trouble:
the sorts of arguments offered for the representational mechanisms being action-oriented
seem to undermine the sorts of arguments offered for the representational content being
action-oriented, and vice-versa.
In Sections 2-6, I introduce each of the distinct respects in which perception can be said
to be action-oriented. Section 7 explores the use of action-oriented perceptual represen-
tations in embodied cognitive science.
2 The evolution of perception as action-oriented
There is an evolutionary sense in which perception can be described as action-oriented,
that is often expressed with the claim that perception is “for action”. Proponents of this
view emphasise that our perceptual capacities evolved to guide our bodily interactions
with the world, specifically those interactions which increased our adaptive fitness. Talk-
ing about visual perception, for example, Briscoe claims that:
“[f]rom an biological or evolutionary standpoint, it is reasonable to think
that vision is for action, that its preeminent biological function is to adapt
an animal’s bodily movements to the properties of the environment that it
inhabits” (Briscoe, 2014, p. 202, my italics).
On one interpretation of such claims, the idea that perception is “for action” in an evo-
lutionary sense seems trivially true, and it’s not clear whether any believer in evolution
would deny it. But the evolutionary claim is often put forward in a stronger way: the
assumption is sometimes that perception evolved directly to guide action and not (or at
least not directly) to present the perceiver with an action-neutral description of the objec-
tive world. If perception evolved for its action-guiding properties, so this line of thought
goes, then it did not evolve to enable us to have beliefs about how the world is, inde-
pendently of our own actions. Proponents of this view either conclude that we do not
perceive the objective world in an action-neutral way, or that if we do, this is not the
primary function of our perceptual systems: perception did not evolve in order to pro-
vide inputs to the human capacity to think and reason about the world. Representative
versions of this view can be found in the works of philosophers like Patricia Churchland
and Kathleen Akins:
“looked at from an evolutionary point of view, the principle function of ner-
vous systems is to get the body parts where they should be in order that the
organism may survive. [. . . ] Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the
hindmost.” (Churchland, 1987, p. 548)
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“evolution will favor sensory solutions that package the information in effi-
cient and quickly accessible formats, in ways that match the particular phys-
ical form of the motor system, its motor tasks, and hence informational re-
quirements. [. . . ] the elegant solutions that evolution eventually selects need
not involve any straightforward (to our eyes) ‘veridical’ encoding of sensory
information.” (Akins, 1996, p. 353)
Notice that this involves a strong commitment to a particular evolutionary story. Pro-
ponents of this view have to rule out the possibility that the development of amodal
cognition could have been more adaptive than a faster but less flexible system in which
specific sensory inputs drove specific motor outputs. Some scientists claim exactly this,
arguing that game theory demonstrates that selection pressures would make objective
representations of the world an unlikely outcome (Hoffman, Singh, & Mark, 2013), but
this is often assumed rather than argued for. Notice that even if one accepts that evolu-
tion selected for action-guiding perception, this is consistent with the claim that evolution
also selected for the kind of perception that can yield reasoning capacities and abstract
thought. It might be the case, in other words, that we have two forms of perception. This
is a possibility raised by the dual-visual system theory of perception, discussed in the
next section.
3 The mechanisms of perception as action-oriented
According to a traditional picture of the mind, perceiving and acting are distinct mecha-
nisms which are separate from each other and from our thinking mechanisms: perception
provides input for thought, and action emerges as the output of thought. (This is what
Susan Hurley (1998) terms the ‘classical sandwich’ picture of the mind.) This picture
is challenged by empirical work which suggests that the mechanisms of perceiving and
acting are closely intertwined, overlapping, or even co-constituting. If this is true, then
there is a sense in which the mechanisms of perception can be action-oriented regardless
of their evolutionary history.
One example of this comes from the literature on so-called ‘mirror neurons’: in macaque
monkeys, neurons known to control hand and mouth movements fire both when the mon-
key is manipulating an object (e.g. reaching for a piece of food) and when the monkey
is watching someone perform a similar manipulation. In creatures like humans, where
single-cell recordings are not possible, there is similar data showing that areas of the
brain associated with movement are active during perceptual processing: one and the
same neural mechanism seems to be involved in both perception and action. Percep-
tion is action-oriented in the sense that a perceptual mechanism seems to overlap with a
mechanism for action.
In visual psychology, Milner and Goodale (1995) have advanced the ‘dual visual sys-
tems’ hypothesis, which concerns the way that visual perception builds up information
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about the world. They have demonstrated that sensory input to the visual system of pri-
mate brains can be processed by two independent pathways. The processes in the ventral
pathway reflect the traditional picture of perception as the input to thought: they pro-
duce conscious perceptual states that we can categorize, memorize, and combine with
thoughts to produce a broad range of actions. The processes in the dorsal pathway, how-
ever, do not seem to be the inputs to thought: these visual inputs instead lead only to the
specific motor outputs involved in reaching and grasping objects with our hands. The
dorsal processes seem to be action-oriented in the sense that visual input results in the
appropriate motor output without the intermediary of conscious thought.
This sort of ‘close coupling’ between sensory input and motor output is also found in
robotics and artificial intelligence. The traditional view of perception and action as dis-
tinct mechanisms separated by central thought processes creates engineering problems
for designers of intelligent systems by causing bottlenecks to occur: the sorts of think-
ing required to update plans and amend instructions slows down the system’s ability to
respond to sensory stimuli. Roboticists like Rodney Brooks produced systems that could
interact with their environments in real-time, by cutting out the central ‘mind’ focusing
instead on using specific input sensors to generate specific outputs. Brooks (1991) pro-
poses that arranging these sensory-motor couplings in ‘layers’ in the appropriate way,
surprisingly intelligent behavior can be produced. One layer might govern general loco-
motion, such that a robot will move around at random until it hits an obstacle. Another
layer might then take over and turn the robot until the way is clear, before control reverts
to the first layer. A third layer might sense red light and keep the robot on track to reach
the light, thus overriding the first layer’s random movement. Each sensory process in
these robotic architectures is thus action-oriented in the sense that that each layer has
its own sensors which operate exclusively for one kind of behavior. There is no amodal
cognition or control: the communication between the layers is minimal, and amounts to
just switching each other on and off. Such architectures can be used to create systems
that display a remarkable amount of seemingly intelligent flexible behavior from purely
reflex-like action-oriented sensory-motor couplings. It remains an empirical question
whether such architectures can simulate higher-level behaviours, such as deciding be-
tween actions, without the addition of central thought mechanisms.
The three examples I’ve considered – mirror neurons, the dorsal visual stream, and
sensory-motor architectures – are examples of ways in which the mechanisms of per-
ception could be said to be action-oriented. Notice that claims about action-oriented
perceptual mechanisms are independent from the previously considered claim that per-
ception is action-oriented in the sense of having evolved to guide action. First, consider
the robotic architectures just described. The fact that an optimal engineering solution
uses action-oriented perceptual mechanisms (in the sense of reflex-like couplings be-
tween sensory inputs and motor outputs) doesn’t tell us that human perceptual systems
actually evolved such couplings: evolutionary solutions are often the satisfactory but sub-
optimal ones, rather than the optimal solutions. Second, while the dorsal visual stream’s
use of sensory input to directly guide action seems to support the evolutionary claim,
it does so only with respect to a certain subset of perceptual processing: the guiding
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of fine-grained motor control, rather than action more generally. And the ventral visual
stream seems to have evolved to generate the kind of perceptual states that can input into
thought, which is exactly what the proponents of the stronger evolutionary claims want to
deny. Third, despite many claims about the evolutionary purpose mirror neurons might
have served, it’s not clear that we can draw any conclusions about the action-oriented na-
ture of perceptual evolution from the empirical data. Cecilia Heyes (2009), for example,
has persuasively argued that mirror neurons are a byproduct of our general capacity for
associative learning and not the result of evolutionary adaption.
4 The contents of perception as action-oriented
Many of the claims about action-oriented perception in philosophy concern the contents
of perception: how the world is presented to us in experience. It is traditionally assumed
that perception presents the world to us in a way that is entirely neutral with respect to
the actions one might perform: while the contents of beliefs might present the world to us
in terms of how we can act on it (presenting food as edible or stairs as climbable, for ex-
ample), such contents are not available in perception, according to the traditional view of
perceptual content as action-neutral. Proponents of action-oriented perceptual content,
on the other hand, propose that action-involving properties like edibility or climbabil-
ity can be presented to us in the contents of perception: “we see objects as edible, and
do not just believe that they are” (Nanay, 2012, p. 430). Following Gibson (1979), we
can use the term ‘affordance’ to describe properties like edibility and climbability, and
characterize the action-oriented view of perceptual content as the claim that we perceive
affordances. Action-oriented views of perceptual content come in different strengths,
depending on how they characterize the idea of affordances. To perceive the world as
affording a certain action might, on a weak reading, mean that we perceive the possi-
bilities for action: the sorts of actions we are capable of performing. A stronger reading
would claim that action-oriented perceptual content presents the world to us in a way that
solicits or encourages us to act in a certain way; and an even stronger reading views af-
fordance properties in perceptual content as mandating or demanding a particular action.
Action-oriented perceptual content need not be consciously experienced by the perceiver,
but there is a way of extending the idea of action-oriented perceptual content to include
the phenomenal character of perception, which I’ll discuss in the next section.
As I am using the notion of perceptual content here in a weak way, according to which
talk of perceptual content is talk of the world as presenting itself to the perceiver in ex-
perience. Such talk is not committed to the stronger claim that perceptual experience
fundamentally consists in the subject perceptually representing their environment as be-
ing a certain way. The weaker notion of perceptual content is therefore not committed to
representationalism about perception, but is compatible with at least some forms of rela-
tionalism (Siegel, 2014). Furthermore, proponents of action-oriented perceptual content
might conceive of content as propositional or non-propositional; as structured conceptu-
ally or non-conceptually; as Russellian or Fregean, or in terms of possible worlds; and
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as environment-dependent or independent.
It is important to emphasise that since action-oriented perceptual content is not commit-
ted to this content being carried by a particular neural or psychological mechanism, then
a fortiori it is not committed to the existence of action-oriented perceptual mechanisms.
This will be further discussed later in Section 7.
5 The phenomenal character of perception as action-oriented
Philosophers draw a distinction between the content of perception and its phenomenal
character. To talk of perceptual content is to talk of how perception presents the world;
whereas to talk of the phenomenal character of perception is to talk of the qualitative
properties of the perceptual state, or what it feels like to undergo the perceptual expe-
rience. If we assume that perceptual states need not be consciously experienced, then
is possible for a perceptual state with the sort of action-oriented content outlined above
to lack phenomenal character altogether. And where a perceptual state has phenome-
nal character and action-oriented content, that action-oriented content might be “non-
soliciting” (Siegel, 2014): one could consciously perceive something as affording action
without experiencing the motivation to perform that action. Similarly, Prosser (2011)
proposes that the phenomenal character of a perceptual state correlates with its action-
oriented perceptual content, but doesn’t claim that the phenomenal character itself is
action-oriented.
But it looks like there could be cases where the phenomenal character of a perceptual
state is itself action-oriented. Siegel (2014), for example, claims that perceiving what
the environment affords can sometimes be accompanied by a felt quality of solicitation,
where the perceptual experience has a qualitative feel of inviting or prompting us to act. If
we think of this as action-oriented phenomenal character, then it looks like phenomenal
character might be action-oriented to differing degrees: some perceptual experiences
might not just feel like invitations or prompts, but more like urges that motivate us to
act. Siegel (2014) proposes that this particular subset of perceptual states with action-
oriented phenomenal character have a “feeling of answerability” and are experienced as
mandates for action.
Notice that how one understands the relation between action-oriented content and action-
oriented phenomenal character will depend on one’s attitude more generally to the rela-
tion between perceptual content and phenomenal character. A proponent of strong in-
tentionalism about phenomenal character, for example, would presumably claim that any
action-oriented aspects of phenomenal character reduce to the action-oriented properties
of the perceptual content. At the other end of the spectrum, one might think that phenom-
enal character is entirely independent of perceptual content, and thus that it is possible to
have two perceptual experiences with the same content but distinct characters.
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6 The nature of perception as action-oriented
I have suggested that claims about perception being action-oriented can be understood
as making a variety of different claims about the evolution, mechanisms, content, or
character of perception. But there remains a further question about the modal strength
of the claims being made. Should we understand any of these claims as proposing that
perception is necessarily action-oriented in any of these senses? And if so, what kind of
necessity is involved?
I take it that most of those making action-oriented claims concerning the evolution of per-
ception or the mechanisms of perception are making largely empirical claims about fea-
tures of perception in the actual world. But at least some proponents of action-oriented
perception seem to be making modal claims, which can be interpreted in at least two
ways. On one hand, the necessity at play might be nomological necessity. To say that per-
ception is necessarily action-oriented in the nomological sense is not to say that percep-
tion is action-oriented in all possible worlds, but rather to say that the laws of nature in the
actual world make it physically impossible for perception not to be action-oriented in the
actual world. Alternatively, the necessity in question might be metaphysical necessity,
concerning the nature of perception across possible worlds. To posit a metaphysically
necessary connection between perception and action is to claim that there is no possible
world in which perception is not action-oriented in some appropriate sense.
The claims made by some proponents of sensorimotor theories of perception, such as
Alva Noe¨ (2004) and Susan Hurley (1998), seem to suggest that there is a constitutive
dependence of perception on our capacity for action: that to be a perceiver is necessar-
ily to be an agent. It is not clear what kind of necessity is involved, but their reliance
on empirical evidence suggests that they are primarily concerned with making a case
for nomological necessity. The case for action being metaphysically necessary for per-
ception is perhaps found in Schellenberg (2010) exploration of the relationship between
perception, self-location, and spatial know-how. Her key claim, that perception requires
the capacity to know what it would be to act in relation to objects, seems to rely on our
intuitions about how perception could be in possible worlds rather than how it is in the
actual world.
Notice that even where claims of nomological necessity are made and supported by em-
pirical evidence about the mechanisms of perception, there is not direct entailment from
action-oriented perceptual mechanisms to the claim that perception is necessarily action-
oriented. We cannot simply read off claims of nomological necessity from empirical
facts (Callender, 2011). And claiming that perception is necessarily action-oriented in
the sense that Schellenberg intends does not entail that either perceptual content or phe-
nomenal character is action-oriented. In fact, Schellenberg proposes that perception’s de-
pendence on action capacities is what allows us to perceive more than just the relational
or perspectival properties associated with affordances: she claims that the action-oriented
nature of perception can account for our access to the intrinsic, observer-independent
properties of the objects perceived.
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7 What about action-oriented representation?
I’ve differentiated several different approaches to perception that fall under the umbrella-
term ‘action-oriented’, and demonstrated that each approach makes claims that are in-
dependent from the others. There is no entailment from one variety of action-oriented
perception to another without the addition of further premises.
While I’ve talked about the mechanisms of perception and the content of perception, I
have said little about the matter of perceptual representations: content-bearing internal
states of the perceiver. In fact, many people working in action-oriented perception want
to play down the role of representations. This is because in cognitive science, represen-
tational mechanisms are traditionally posited to account for the flexibility of intelligent
human behaviour: our capacity to respond differently to similar stimuli, and similarly
to different stimuli, in a way that can’t be easily accounted for in terms of reflex-like
responses. Positing internal representations allows cognitive science to say that the same
stimulus can be represented in different ways: the same extensional content can be car-
ried by different representational ‘vehicles’ which play distinct causal roles within the
cognitive mechanism.1 These vehicles are just internal representations individuated by
the non-semantic properties in virtue of which they are causally efficacious: the formal,
functional, or physical properties to which the cognitive mechanisms are sensitive. Thus
two representations are tokens of the same vehicle type when they are treated similarly
by the cognitive processes at play (Shea, 2007).
Traditionally, cognitive science suggests that these representational mechanisms are gen-
uinely cognitive in the sense of being non-perceptual: they are distinct from the mech-
anisms of perception, and they are what allow the same perceptual input to result in
different action outputs. Proponents of embodied cognitive science, however, deny that
explanations of flexible and context-specific behaviour require this sort of mediating rep-
resentational mechanism. They argue instead that if perceptual mechanisms are action-
oriented in the sense discussed in Section 3, then these sorts of coupled mechanisms can
account for the behaviour.
But not everyone agrees that the insights from action-oriented approaches to perception
should lead to the rejection of internal representational states. There are many within
embodied cognitive science who allow that there are internal representations, but deny
that these are the sort of amodal cognitive representations in a central cognitive architec-
ture. Andy Clark (1997), for example, argues that behaviour is not mediated by “action-
independent inner states; ones which require additional cognitive operations to drive
appropriate behavior”, but rather by action-oriented representations which are “poised
between pure control structures and passive representations of external reality” (Clark,
1997, p. 49). A similar approach is put forward by Michael Wheeler, who understands
1For naturalistic reasons, cognitive science is generally committed to extensional content.
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the idea of action-oriented perceptual representations as “special-purpose adaptive cou-
plings” that are “tailored to a particular behavior” (Wheeler, 2005, p. 196). Both Clark
and Wheeler propose that the sorts of action-oriented mechanisms of perception dis-
cussed in Section 3 are best understood as representational mechanisms: as containing
perceptual states which are both causally efficacious and semantically evaluable. They
argue that these perceptual representations themselves, and not just the mechanisms in
which they occur, should be understood as action-oriented because in virtue of the way
that they are causally coupled to certain motor processes.
To claim that a mechanism is representational is to be committed to vehicles of content.
But this does not commit one to any particular views about the nature of that content:
what it is or how it is determined, evaluated, or structured. (We might agree that a list of
items is a representation, while disagreeing over whether it is a description or an instruc-
tion, for example; we might believe a drawing to be a map without knowing what it is
of; we might know that someone’s utterances are linguistic without knowing what they
mean.) To understand an internal state as a representational vehicle does not, therefore,
entail a particular view of its content. A fortiori, it does not entail that its content is action-
oriented in the sense of presenting the world in action-relevant ways. The reverse is also
true, as already discussed in Section 4: action-oriented perceptual content is neutral with
regard to the mechanisms of perception, and therefore compatible with a range of cog-
nitive architectures. Action-oriented perceptual content does not entail action-oriented
perceptual mechanisms, and a fortiori does not entail that there are action-oriented vehi-
cles of representation bearing the action-oriented perceptual content.
Interestingly, however, both Clark and Wheeler seem to assume that their action-oriented
vehicles of perceptual representation have action-oriented perceptual content. Clark
claims that action-oriented perceptual representations “simultaneously describe aspects
of the world and prescribe possible actions”, with the result that “to thus know the world
is at once to know what possibilities it affords for action and intervention” (Clark, 1997,
p. 49), while Wheeler claims that action-oriented perceptual states “represent the world
in terms of specifications for possible actions” with “bearer-relative content” (Wheeler,
2005, p. 196). Their action-oriented representations, in other words, seem to be ex-
amples of action-oriented perceptual mechanisms with action-oriented perceptual con-
tents.
Neither Clark nor Wheeler explain why they think that action-oriented vehicles will have
action-oriented contents. Any attempt to reconstruct their arguments will, I suggest, en-
counter the following problem: reasons to think of perceptual vehicles as action-oriented
seem to undermine our reasons to think of perceptual contents as action oriented, and
vice-versa.
To see this, consider the role played by representational vehicles. Recall that vehicles
are just internal representations individuated by the non-semantic properties in virtue
of which they are causally efficacious within the representational mechanisms. Vehi-
cles provide a naturalistic way of understanding how the same extensional content can
play distinct cognitive roles, such as when the same heavenly body is thought about in
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different ways according to the time of day it is observed. The extensional content is
the same, but the representational vehicles have distinct causal properties in each case
and thus interact differently with other states of the mechanism. If we claim, as Clark
and Wheeler do, that representational vehicles should be individuated according to their
action-guiding properties, then this enables us to show how the same extensional content
(e.g. a mountain) can be represented as climbable in one context and unclimbable in
another context: distinct vehicles, with different causal relations to action, can carry the
same extensional content. But if this is the role of representational vehicles, to provide
a naturalistic means of accounting for modes of presentation, then it removes the need
to think of the content itself as action-oriented. The perceptual content can be action-
neutral because the relevant action-guiding information is supplied by the perceptual
mechanisms.
One might, however, have independent motivation for thinking that affordance properties
are part of the perceptual content itself: we perceive the climbability of the mountain, for
example, rather than perceptually representing the mountain as climbable. But if we
don’t need to perceptually represent the mountain as being as certain way, then it’s not
clear what motivation we’d have for positing vehicles of representation, rather than non-
representational mechanisms. This, I take it, is the essence of Gibson’s (1979) view of
perception. And even if we had reason to posit representational mechanisms, we’d then
need a further argument for individuating the representational vehicles according to their
action-guiding properties.
In summary, the arguments for taking perceptual vehicles to be action-oriented seem to
undermine the arguments for taking perceptual contents to be action-oriented, and the
arguments for taking perceptual contents to be action-oriented seem to undermine the
arguments for taking perceptual vehicles to be action-oriented. None of this rules out
that there may be arguments from the action-oriented status of either vehicles or contents
to the other, but it suggests that the onus is on proponents of such views to provide
them.
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